Abstract. For the power consumption model called Hamming weight model, we rewrite DPA attacks in terms of correlation coefficients between two Boolean functions. We exhibit properties of S-boxes (also called (n, m)-functions) relied on DPA attacks. We show that these properties are opposite to the non-linearity criterion and to the propagation criterion. To quantify the resistance of an S-box to DPA attacks, we introduce the notion of transparency order of an S-box and we study this new criterion with respect to the non-linearity and to the propagation criterion.
Introduction
Block cipher algorithms embedded in cryptographic devices are sensitive to two main kinds of attacks, which are usually investigated in parallel. The first kind relies on the properties of the cryptographic primitives involved in the cryptosystem. The second kind is based on the analysis of the hardware's leakages.
The most well-known attacks against block ciphers algorithms are the knownplaintext attacks called differential cryptanalysis [2, 13] and linear cryptanalysis [19] . Most block cipher algorithms (such as DES or AES) use vectorial functions, also called S-boxes, as cryptographic primitives. To protect such cryptosystems against linear and differential attacks, S-boxes are designed to fulfil some cryptographic criteria (balancedness, high nonlinearity or high algebraic degree).
Since electronic components are not usually perfectly tamper-proof, one can obtain sensitive information from side channels such as the timing of operations or the power consumption. In 1996, Kocher successfully used this approach to exhibit a first side-channel attack effective enough to recover secret keys in numerous cryptosystems [14] . Since Kocher's original paper, a large number of very efficient attacks has been reported on a wide variety of cryptographic implementations (see for instance [4, 5, 8, 11, 20, 23] ). Among these attacks, the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is one of the most powerfull against iterated block ciphers. DPA are usually used to attack on either the first or the last round but it can sometimes be applied to attack on intern rounds of the block ciphers. It requires the knowledge of either the plaintext or the ciphertext. It relies on a statistical analysis of a large number of samples where the same key operates on different data. For this strategy of attacks, S-boxes involved in the cryptosystems are usually considered by cryptanalysts and also by cryptographers as oracles providing the output corresponding to a given data. So, to withstand DPA attacks, countermeasures are added at the implementation level to make the signals needed for these attacks useless.
The efficiency of DPA attacks is much greater than the efficiency of differential or linear cryptanalysis 1 . Moreover, in the area of embedded cryptography, because of the life expectancy of the device, known-plaintext attacks requiring a large number of pairs plaintext/ciphertext or requiring a large number of encryptions are unpracticable. The difference between the efficiencies of the two categories of attacks is not taken into account to design block ciphers for smart cards. Indeed, nearly all the algorithms embedded in smart cards have been designed to resist at high level to linear, differential and high-order differential attacks, whereas nothing has been done to make them inherently resistant to DPA attacks. Countermeasures against DPA attacks are generally added to the algorithms when implemented on devices. Following this addition, the performances and the code sizes of the resulting embedded algorithms are approximately multiplied by two. This increase is damaging in the area of embedded cryptography where the computation power and the memory capability are limited. The design of DPA-resistant algorithms would make the addition of countermeasures innecessary. Such a design could be done by selecting pertinent S-boxes.
For a very particular power consumption model, Guilley et al. studied in [9] the single-bit DPA attack in terms of correlation coefficients between two Boolean signals, the first one depending on linear combinations of output-bits of S-boxes and the second one depending on consumption. The authors pointed out that the better shielded against linear cryptanalysis an S-box is, the more vulnerable it is to side-channel attacks such as DPA. In this paper, we extend the study of Guilley et al. for multi-bit DPA attacks and for the power consumption model called Hamming weight model. We exhibit the properties of S-boxes related to DPA attacks. We argue that these new properties and the classical cryptographic criteria (such as the high non-linearity or the satisfaction of propagation criteria at high level) cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Since a highly non-linear S-box cannot withstand DPA attacks in an optimal way, we point out that a trade-off between the classical cryptographic criteria and resistance to DPA attacks has to be found. We introduce a new cryptographic criteria, that we call transparency order of an S-box, to quantify the resistance of an S-box to DPA attacks. We exhibit lower and upper bounds on it and we study their tightness. We prove in particular that bent functions (and more generally functions satisfying P C(l) for a high level l) cannot by definition resist DPA attacks. To ensure the resistance of an algorithm to these attacks, we argue that the new criterion must be satisfied at a certain level and that this level depends on the amount of noise inside the device and/or the number of encryptions that a cryptanalyst can do with the same key. This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we recall the basic facts about the main cryptographic properties of S-boxes. In Sect. 3, we give the formal definition of an iterated block cipher and we recall the theory behind DPA attacks. To establish the relationship between these attacks and the cryptographic properties of S-boxes, we rewrite in Sect. 4 the DPA attacks in terms of correlation coefficients. After arguing that the efficiency of (single-bit or multi-bit) DPA attacks relies on the behavior of the so-called differential trace, we analyze it in Sect. 5. We use this analysis in Sect. 6 to investigate how S-boxes can withstand DPA attacks. In Sect. 7, we introduce and we briefly study the notion of transparency order of a function, whose aim is to quantify the resistance of an S-box to DPA attacks.
Notation and Preliminaries
In this paper, we distinguish the additions of integers in R, denoted by +, and the additions mod 2, denoted by ⊕. For simplicity and because there will be no ambiguity, we denote by + the addition of vectors of F n 2 (words) with n > 1. We call (n, m)-function any mapping F from F 
For every vector a ∈ F n 2 , n ∈ N, we denote by H(a) the Hamming weight of a. We denote the all-zero vector (resp. the all-one vector) on 
The usual scalar product is denoted by "·". We recall that it is defined for every pair of vectors a = (a 1 , · · · , a m ) and
To make the study of the properties of F easier, we introduce the sign func-
F (x) ). For every (n, m)-function F and for every vector v ∈ F m 2 , we have:
The Fourier transform of the sign function of an (n, m)-function F (that we call Walsh transform of F ) is the function W F defined on F n 2 × F m 2 by the formula:
As we recall in the following proposition, the balancedness of a function can be characterized through its Walsh transform's coefficients. Let n be a positive integer and let f and g be two Boolean functions defined on F n 2 , the correlation coefficient of f and g, denoted by Cor (f, g), is defined by:
If the output-bits of two Boolean functions are statistically independent, then their correlation coefficient equals zero.
The nonlinearity of a function F is one of the parameters which quantify the level of confusion brought in the system by the function (another such parameter is the degree). The nonlinearity of a vectorial function F is defined as the minimum Hamming distance between the nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F and the set of all Boolean affine functions (that is functions
. Cryptographic functions used in block ciphers must have high nonlinearities to prevent linear attacks (see [19] ).
For every (n, m)-function F , the nonlinearity N F and the Walsh transform
If n is even and m ≤ n 2 , then this bound is tight. The functions achieving it are called bent.
Another useful tool for quantifying the cryptographic resistance of functions is the notion of derivative. The derivative of F with respect to a vector a ∈ F n 2 is the (n, m)-function D a F : x → F (x) + F (x + a). The notion of derivative is related to differential and higher-order differential attacks [2, 13, 17] . A vector a ∈ F n 2 such that D a F is a constant function is called linear structure of F . The space {a ∈ F n 2 ; D a F = cst} is called linear space of F and it is denoted by ε F . As argued by Evertse in [7] , the linear spaces of functions used as cryptographic primitives in iterated block ciphers have be reduced to the null vector in order to protect the systems against differential attacks. 
The Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) was introduced by Webster and Tavares in [30] and this concept was generalized into the Propagation Criterion (P C) by Preneel [28] . These properties describe the behavior of a function whenever some input coordinates are complemented. They must be satisfied at high levels, in particular by functions involved in block ciphers. A function F satisfies P C(l) if the function D a F is balanced for every vector a of weight at most l. In [29] , Rothaus showed that a function is bent if and only if it satisfies P C(n).
In the next section, our aim is to highlight the role that (n, m)-functions play in DPA attacks on block ciphers.
Introduction to Iterated Block Ciphers
To define an iterated block cipher in a formal way, we usually consider a family (F K ) K∈K of (n, n)-functions indexed by a value K ∈ K, where K is called the round key space. The encryption function of the iterated block cipher with block size n, with R rounds and with round functions F K is defined by:
where X (0) is the plaintext and X (R) is the ciphertext. The vector (K 1 , . . . , K R ) is called the key and its coordinates are the round keys.
As recalled in Sect. 2, balancedness is a fundamental property which has to be satisfied by every designed round function F K , K ∈ K. A classical way to define the balanced functions F K is to design or select the coordinates functions of each F K being pairwisely independent. We assume in this paper that the coordinate functions of every round function F K are pairwisely independent.
Introduction to Differential Power Analysis
Differential Power Analysis uses the fact that computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. Specific methods for analyzing the power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper-resistant devices have been studied in [3, 15, 23] . In what follows, we use notations introduced in [15] . Moreover, we assume that the set K equals F r 2 , where r is a positive integer.
Let (F K ) K∈F r 2 be a family of (n, n)-functions used as round functions in an iterated block cipher embedded in a smart card, the power consumption of the smart card after one round of the encryption of a message X ∈ F n 2 using a round keyK ∈ F r 2 is usually (cf. [3, 15] ) denoted by CK(X). Function CK is called power consumption function related toK or power consumption function if there is no ambiguity onK.
To describe the DPA attacks, one usually introduces a Boolean function D called selection function and defined for every 3-tuple (X, K, j) ∈ F 
2 and for every integer j ≤ n, the differential trace of K with respect to the 3-tuple (K, N, j) is denoted by ∆ K,K (N, j) and defined by:
, (5) where CK is the power consumption function related toK.
For large values N , the value
In Relation (5), information about the secret parameterK is given by the power consumption function CK. Each value CK(X) can be viewed as the energy to flip bits from a previous state to state FK(X). To better understand the kind of information this function can give about the round keyK, a theoretical model for the power consumption of devices must be introduced.
In this paper, we use the Hamming distance model introduced in [3] as a generalization of the Hamming weight model (cf. [1] ). In the Hamming distance model, it is assumed that switching a bit from 0 to 1 requires the same amount of energy as switching it from 1 to 0. The average power consumption to switch a bit from 0 to 1 is denoted by c and for every pair (X, K) ∈ F n 2 × F r 2 , one denotes by α(X, K) ∈ F n 2 the value of the data which is replaced by F K (X) on the device. We call state function function α. For every pair (X, K) ∈ F n 2 × F r 2 , we assume throughout this paper that the power consumption C K (X) satisfies the relation C K (X) = c × H (α(X, K) + F K (X)) + w, where w denotes a noise.
Remark 2. Due to Relation (1), we have:
In the following section, we describe DPA attacks more formally and we rewrite the differential trace in terms of correlation coefficients for balanced Sboxes and for constant noise w.
DPA Attacks and Correlations

Single-bit DPA Attacks
One denotes byK the first round key used in an iterated block cipher encrypting messages X. We assume in this section that a cryptanalyst wants to retrieveK and that he has measured nearly all the values CK(X), X ranges over F n 2 . In the rest of the paper, since we only consider the restriction α(·,K) of the state function α, we denote by α the function X → α(X,K) to simplify notations.
n } × {1, · · · , n} be a fixed 3-tuple. In a DPA attack, coefficients ∆ K,K (N, j) are computed for different round keys K ∈ F r 2 until one value is significantely greater than the others. Let us denote by K t the corresponding key. The core of the attack is the following: if ∆ Kt,K (N, j) is significantely greater than the other values ∆ K,K (N, j), K ∈ F r 2 , then equality K t =K holds with high probability. Since such an attack uses one single bit (of index j) of the outputs FK(X), it is usually called single-bit DPA attack.
Currently, the main cryptographic properties of S-boxes (nonlinearity, resiliency, balancedness and propagation criteria) are characterized through the Walsh transform. Therefore, to reveal the properties of balanced S-boxes that are related to DPA attacks, we start rewriting the differential trace of a vector in terms of correlation coefficients.
be a family of (n, n)-functions. Let α denote the state function of a cryptographic system implementing F K , K ∈ F r 2 , as round functions and let c denote the average power consumption to switch a bit in the system. If all the functions F K are balanced, then for every pair (K,K) ∈ F r 2 2 and for every positive integer j ≤ n, we have :
where
Because we assume that every F K is balanced, it follows that cardinality of Supp(v · F K ) equals 2 n−1 for every pair (v,
. This equality and Relation (6) imply
where we recall that w denotes a constant noise. Due to the balancedness of F K and Proposition 1, the first summation in Relation (8) is null for every non-zero vector v and for every K ∈ F r 2 . Because the second summation in Relation (8) equals (8) and (7) are equivalent.
More generally a DPA attack can be done by studying correlations between a non-zero linear combination v · F K and all the coordinate functions of FK, when K ranges over F r 2 .. To take this remark into account, we extend Definition 1 by assuming that the differential trace of a vector K is defined with respect to a pair (K, v) by:
In our model, a single-bit DPA attack on the first round of a block cipher is led by designing, for a vector v ∈ F n 2 * , the set of round keys K such that |∆ K,K (v)| is maximal.
Multi-bit DPA Attacks
Single-bit DPA attacks were generalized in multi-bit DPA attacks in [3, 21, 22, 24, 27] . Among these generalizations, the multi-bit DPA attack proposed by Brier et al. in [3] is the most efficient. It is led by searching for high correlations between functions X → H (F K (X)), K ∈ F r 2 , and the power consumption function X → CK(X), whereK is the expected round key. One can prove as in Lemma 1 (and for the same assumptions on (F K ) K∈F r 2 ) that multi-bit DPA attack is done by selecting round keys K which maximize the value δK(K) defined for every pair (K,K) ∈ F r 2 2 by:
To better understand how the candidate round keys are selected, we study the differential trace in the next section.
Analysis of the Differential Trace
Values ∆ K,K (v) (and hence δK(K)) are strongly related to the assumptions which are made on the state function α. Indeed, as noticed in [3, 5, 8] , if α is supposed to be unknown and dependent on FK, then the values taken by (K, v) → ∆ K,K (v) cannot be used to get information about the round keyK. Consequently, it is usually assumed either that functions α and F K are independent for every round key K ∈ F r 2 , or that α is constant.
Functions F K and Function α Are Independent
To prevent statistical attacks, round functions (F K ) K∈F r 2 of iterated block ciphers are currently designed such that the coordinates of vectors Y = F K (X), X ∈ F n 2 , are statistically independent. Moreover, to withstand differential and statistical attacks, the functions in (F K ) K∈F r 2 are defined to be as uncorrelated as possible. Then, for every pair of distinct elements (K,K) ∈ F r 2 2 and for every pair (u, v) ∈ F n 2 * × F n 2 * , u = v, one can realistically assume in a cryptographic area that Cor(v · F K , u · FK) equals zero (let us notice that in the particular case u = v, it cannot be usually assumed that functions u · F K and u · FK are uncorrelated). This assumption is related to the hypothesis of wrong-key randomization [10, 16] . Under this assumption, we argue in the following proposition that the differential trace has a very simple behavior.
be a family of (n, n)-functions. Let α denote the state function of a cryptographic system implementing functions F K , K ∈ F r 2 , as round functions and let c denote the average power consumption to switch a bit in the system. If for every pair (K,K) ∈ F r 2 2 and for every pair of distinct vectors (u, v) ∈ F n 2 2 s.t. H(u) = 1, functions u · F K and v · FK are independent and if α is independent of the round functions F K for every K ∈ F r 2 , then for every
is constant and equals 0 otherwise.
Proof. Because the functions α and F K are independent for every K ∈ F r 2 , the correlation coefficient
We assumed that Boolean functions v · F K and u · FK are independent for every pair (K,K) ∈ F r 2 2 and every pair of distinct vectors (u, v) such that H(u) = 1. One deduces that if v · F K ⊕ u · FK is constant, then u equals v (and H(v) = 1).
Study of ∆ K,K when α Is Constant
It is realistic to assume that during the execution of an algorithm embedded in smart cards, state function α is constant. This can be assigned to the so-called pre-charged logic where the bus is cleared between each significant transferred value or when the previous operation concerning the bus is an opcode loading (cf. [5] ). As explained in [3] , another possible reason is that complex architectures implement separated busses for data and addresses, that may prohibit certain transitions.
Proposition 2 was established after assuming in particular that functions v · F K ⊕ u · FK and u · α are independent for every pair of distinct nonzero vectors (u, v) ∈ F n 2 2 , H(u) = 1, and every pair (K,K). When α is assumed to be constant, this assumption cannot be satisfied. However when α is constant, Relation (9) can be rewritten
after denoting by β the constant value of α. Thus, one straightforwardly deduces the following proposition:
be a family of (n, n)-functions. Let α denote the state function of a cryptographic device implementing functions F K , K ∈ F r 2 , as round functions and let c denote the average power consumption to switch a bit in the system. Let us assume that functions v · F K and u · FK are independent for every pair (K,K) ∈ F r 2 2 and for every pair of distinct elements (u, v) ∈ F n 2 2 ,
2 , the differential trace of K with respect to (K, v) satisfies:
Efficiency of the Discrimination of Round Keys in DPA Attacks
Usually, DPA attacks do not permitt to obtain the expected keyK immediately but allow to isolate it in a subset of F r 2 . For single-bit DPA attacks (resp. multibit DPA attacks), the elements of this subset correspond to ghost peaks in the distribution of the values of the function
Clearly, the greater the number of ghost peaks, the smaller the efficiency of the attack. Indeed, wrong guesses have to be tested again.
Under assumptions done in Propositions 2 and 3, the set of round keys selected in a single-bit DPA attack with respect to a pair (v,K) contains the set {K ∈ F r 2 | v · (F K + FK) = cst}. Indeed, when the state function is constant or independent of functions F K , then the value |∆ K,K (v)| is maximal for every K belonging to {K ∈ F r 2 | v · (F K + FK) = cst}. For multi-bit DPA attacks on a device with random (or null) state function, the set of selected round keys admits the set {K ∈ F r 2 | F K + FK ∈ {0 n , 1 n }} as a subset.
6 Resistance of S-Boxes to DPA Attacks when Round Keys Are Introduced by Addition
In many iterated block ciphers such as DES [25] or AES [26] , the round key is introduced by addition. In this case, we have r = n and, for every round key K ∈ F n 2 , the round function F K is the function X → F (X + K), where F is a robust cryptographic permutation on F n 2 . In such a system we call S-box the function F .
In the rest of the paper, we assume that the round keys are introduced by addition. Under this assumption, Propositions 2 and 3 imply the following corollary: Corollary 1. Let F be an (n, n)-function whose coordinate functions are pairwisely independent and let α be the state function of a cryptographic device in which F is embedded as an S-box. If α is independent of F or constant, then the number of round keys selected after a single-bit DPA attack with respect to the vector v ∈ F n 2 (resp. after a multi-bit DPA attack) is greater than or equal to #ε v·F (resp. #ε F ).
One cannot withstand multi-bit DPA attacks by increasing the size of the linear space ε F of F , since the elements ofK +ε F act in a very similar way in the cryptosystem. Indeed, by definition of ε F , for every element K inK + ε F , there exists a constant C ∈ F n 2 such that X → F (X +K) and X → F (X + K) + C are equal.
We showed in Sect. 4.2 that only vectors K such that δK(K) is maximal have to be stored as good candidate round keys. In practice, because of the imperfections of the measurements (and also because the values of K → ∆ K,K (N, j), N ≤ 2 n and j ≤ n fixed, are not computed for N = 2 n but for large N 2 n ), every tested vector such that δK(K) is significantely high, is stored as a good candidate key (even if δK(K) is not the maximal value achieved). For this reason, it is difficult to mount an efficient DPA attack when the amplitude of the peaks in the distribution of the values δK(K), K ∈ F n 2 , are not high enough (cf. [5, 6] ). Indeed, let us denote by σ the assumed margin of error on the computation of values δK(K). We argued in Sect. 4 that under some realistic assumptions, the value δK(K) is always maximal for K =K. Thus, if the average value
is smaller than σ, then the peaks in the distribution of values δK(K) could not be identified by an attacker because of the imperfections of the measurements. Reciprocally, if Difference (12) is significantly higher than σ, then the peak corresponding to δK(K) will clearly appear in the distribution of values δK(K) when K ranges over F n 2 . Let us develop the computation of D(K) for α independent of F and for α constant.
Lemma 2. Let F be a (n, n)-function whose coordinate functions are pairwisely independent and let α be the state function of a cryptographic system implementing F as an S-box. If α is independent of F , then for every elementK ∈ F
